The effect of the enterprise risk management implementation on the firm value of European companies by Bertinetti, Giorgio Stefano et al.
 1
THE EFFECT OF THE ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE FIRM VALUE OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES 
 
 
Giorgio Stefano Bertinetti 
Full Professor of Corporate Finance 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873 
30121 Venice 
Tel. +39 041 234 8733 
bertinet@unive.it 
 
 
 
Elisa Cavezzali1 
Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873 
30121 Venice 
Tel. +39 041 234 6931 
elisa.cavezzali@unive.it 
 
 
 
 Gloria Gardenal 
Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873 
30121 Venice 
Tel. +39 041 234 6926 
ggardenal@unive.it 
 
 
(Last version, May 2013) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 Corresponding author. 
 2
THE EFFECT OF THE ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE FIRM VALUE OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We aim to investigate the impact of the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) on the enterprise 
value and to discover the determinants of this adoption. Several economic actors have decided 
to face the current economic and financial complexity shifting from a Traditional silo-based 
Risk Management approach (TRM) to a more comprehensive one: the ERM. Some academics 
have investigated this topic, focusing mainly on the financial industry, but results are still 
controversial. In this study we try to understand if the ERM implementation affects firm value 
on a sample of 200 European companies, both financial and non-financial; second, we test 
which are the determinants of the ERM adoption. We do this through a FE panel regression 
analysis and a FE logistic analysis. We find a positive statistically significant relation between 
the ERM adoption and firm value. As for the probability that a firm engages in an ERM 
protocol, size, beta and profitability are the statistically significant determinants. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the adoption of an Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) system on the company market value and to discover which are the 
determinants of this choice. 
The recent financial crisis, started in 2007 in the US, has once again brought the risk 
management issue to the forefront. Organizations, government regulators, stock exchanges, 
consulting firms, rating agencies, and universities have all begun to consider ERM (Enterprise 
Risk Management) as a way to tackle the economic complexity. As opposed to Traditional 
Risk Management (TRM), where individual risk categories are managed separately in risk 
“silos”, ERM allows firms to manage a wide array of risks in an integrated, enterprise-wide 
fashion (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2006).  
Starting from the early 2000, much has been done to induce companies, mainly operating in 
the financial industry to adopt ERM. In 2004, for example, the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organization of the Treadway Commission (COSO) released the Enterprise Risk 
Management Integrated Framework, which defines ERM as a process, affected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy-setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events which may affect the organization, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives. In the same year, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
issued new corporate governance rules requiring audit committees of listed firms to be more 
involved in risk oversight. These rules led many boards to require the review and approval of 
risk management by their audit committee. In October 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), stemmed from the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) with the 
purpose of helping troubled financial institutions, stipulated that participating firms have to 
certify that executive compensation programs do not encourage excessive risk taking. The 
year after (May 2009), the Shareholder Bill of Rights stated that public companies must create 
stand-alone risk committees comprised entirely of independent directors who are responsible 
for the establishment and evaluation of risk management practices. In February 2010, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promoted new rules for an enhanced risk-related 
disclosure in proxy and annual statements, in particular with respect to the relationship of a 
company’s compensation policies and practices to risk management and the board of 
director’s leadership structure. 
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ERM has been targeted also by rating agencies. Since 2007, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) has 
included a risk management rating as a key factor in its overall rating of insurance companies. 
This index is sophisticated and comprehensive and aims at assessing the risk management 
culture, systems, processes, and practices within the insurer. S&P assigns an “ERM rating” 
score over five categories, ranging from low levels of risk management sophistication (from 
one to three, indicating TRM) to high levels (indicating ERM). 
Despite this increasing interest in risk management, academic research in this area is still 
scant. A reason is the difficulty in developing a reliable measure for the ERM construct. Some 
authors (Beasley, Pagach and Warr, 2008); Hoyt, Liebenberg, 2010) use the appointment of a 
chief risk officer (CRO) as a proxy for ERM implementation. Others (like Gordon, Loeb and 
Tseng, 2009) develop their own index. Moreover, the majority of the empirical studies 
concerns the financial industry, in particular the insurance one. The advantages of 
concentrating on insurance firms are at least two: first, in 2006 S&P started to produce an 
ERM rating only for insurers and not for non-financial firms; second, these firms are in the 
business of pricing risk and thus should be down the road in risk management sophistication 
than non-financial firms. 
Results found so far are as follows: the implementation of ERM benefits firms by decreasing 
earnings and stock price volatility, increasing capital efficiency, and creating synergies 
between different risk management activities (Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Cumming and Hirtle, 
2001; Lam, 2001; Meulbroek, 2002; Beasley, Pagach, and Warr, 2008). Furthermore, ERM 
adoption seems to promote increased risk awareness, which facilitates better operational and 
strategic decision-making. 
The aim of this study double: first, we try to understand if the ERM implementation affects 
firm value of a sample of 200 European companies, belonging to both financial and non-
financial industries; second, we test which are the determinants of the adoption of an ERM 
system.  
We focus on publicly-traded companies in order to be able to access the market-based 
measures of value and because we are more likely to observe public disclosure of ERM 
implementation among this kind of firms. Our primary sources of information are firm 
financial annual reports. Specifically, since the company ERM engagement reporting is not 
mandatory, we collected by hand all the financial reports issued by the selected firms and we 
performed a detailed search for ERM evidence (explicit or implicit, i.e. hiring a CRO) in the 
company disclosure. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review concerning risk 
management, from TRM to ERM. Section 3 presents the research design of our study: first, 
we describe the data and then we declare our empirical model. Section 3 describes our results. 
Section 4 concludes and suggests developments for future results. 
2. Literature review 
Risk management has been a widely debated topic since the 1950s, when Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) first claimed that, under perfect market conditions, it didn’t affect firm value. 
After Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) contribution, some scholars proved that the presence of 
market imperfections is the reason why risk management exists and can increase firm value. 
Such imperfections are notoriously: tax payments; financial distress; underinvestment; 
asymmetric information and under-diversified stakeholders. All these imperfections allow 
risks to impose real costs on firms, which must be minimized. The traditional approach to risk 
management (TRM) suggests both to implement hedging activities (mainly financial 
derivatives), and to buy corporate insurance. Many studies investigate the link between TRM 
and firm value, with controversial results. Allayannis and Weston (2001), Graham and Rogers 
(2002), Nelson, Moffitt, and Afflect-Graves (2005), and Carters, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) 
show a positive relation between risk management (specifically hedging using derivatives) 
and firm value. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) and Jin and Jorion (2006) discover that 
derivative positions of most non-financial companies are too small to significantly affect firm 
value. Another stream of research shows that risk management through hedging mitigates 
incentive conflicts, reduces expected taxes, and improves the firm’s ability to take advantage 
of attractive investment opportunities (Smith and Stulz, 1985; MacMinn, 1987; Campell and 
Kracaw, 1990; Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993), thus increasing their value. 
As far as the demand for corporate insurance is concerned, the literature shows that if 
considered as part of the company’s financing policy, corporate insurance may create new 
value through its effect on investment policy, contracting costs, and the company’s tax 
liabilities (Mayers and Smith, 1982). The empirical evidence around these theoretical 
predictions is mixed: Mayers and Smith (1990), Ashby and Diacon (1998), Hoyt and Khang 
(2000), and Cole and McCullough (2006) support this view; instead, Regan and Hur (2007) 
and Zou and Adams (2008) claim exactly the opposite. 
Despite the attention given to risk management in the last seventy years, the recent financial 
crisis has once again brought this topic to the forefront. In fact, the traditional tools used by 
companies to face risks (hedging and insuring) have revealed themselves to be inefficient in 
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tackling the increasing economic complexity. For this reason, academics and authorities are 
dedicating huge efforts in defining and developing a new framework, defined as Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM). In the literature, ERM is synonymous with Integrated Risk 
Management (IRM), Holistic Risk Management, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management 
(EWRM), and Strategic Risk Management (SRM) (D’Arcy, 2001; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 
2003; Kleffner et al., 2003; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2006; Manab et al., 2007; and Yazid et al., 
2009). For consistency, we use the acronym ERM throughout this study. ERM means to 
integrate or aggregate all types of risks, using integrated tools and techniques to mitigate the 
risks and to communicate across business lines or levels. Integrating refers to the combination 
of: modifying the firm’s operations, adjusting its capital structure and employing targeted 
financial instruments (Meulbroek, 2002).  
Profit maximizing firms should consider implementing and ERM program only if it increases 
expected shareholder wealth. The studies about risk management show that managing each 
risk class in separate silo creates inefficiencies due to lack of coordination between the 
various risk management departments. Supporters of ERM argue that by integrating decision 
making across all risk classes, companies are able to avoid duplication of risk management 
expenditure by exploiting natural hedges. ERM should allow firms to better understand the 
aggregate risk inherit in different business activities, thus providing them with a more 
objective basis for resource allocation which implies improved capital efficiency and return 
on equity. Moreover, ERM provides a structure that combines all risk management activities 
into one integrated framework that facilitates the identification of potential interdependencies 
between risks across activities, which might go unnoticed in the TRM model. So, while 
individual risk management activities can reduce earnings volatility from a specific source 
(hazard risk, interest rate risk, etc.), an ERM strategy aims to reduce volatility by preventing 
aggregation of risk across different sources. Another great advantage of adopting ERM 
programs arises due to improved information about the firm’s risk profile. (Meulbroek, 2002). 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) are the first to study ERM using secondary data. Their research 
focuses mainly on the determinants of the ERM adoption and shows the importance to 
appoint a CRO in order to reduce information asymmetry, implement and manage the ERM 
program. Their results also indicate that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely 
to appoint a CRO and company size is significant in explaining the ERM adoption. 
In another study, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2006) discover that size, institutional ownership and 
international diversification are significant in determining the ERM adoption among US 
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insurance companies. Pagach and Warr (2007) focus on banks and public utilities and find 
that a 10% increase in leverage increases by 7.8% the probability for companies to hire a 
CRO. In addition, the study shows that a 10% size increase increases by 27% the above 
probability, and a 10% increase of earnings results in 4.7% likelihood to hire CRO. 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2008), extending their 2006 study, find that larger firms are more likely 
to engage in ERM than smaller firms. This is supported by pressure from institutional owners 
(institutional ownership). Other determinants, like leverage and reinsurance are negatively 
and significantly related to ERM. 
Given this broad review of the literature, we can move to present our research design. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Dataset description 
In order to test if the ERM implementation increases firm value, we focused our attention on a 
sample of 200 European listed companies, operating in 17 different industries (financial and 
non-financial). Our companies belong to the STOXX® Europe Large 200 Index, which 
represents large capitalization companies, headquartered in Europe.  
The industries represented in our sample are the following: Industrial Goods and Services; 
Personal & Household Goods; Insurance; Retail; Chemicals; Basic Resources; Technology; 
Construction and Materials; Food and Beverages; Healthcare; Banking; Oil and Gas; 
Telecommunications; Utilities; Financial Services; Media; Travel & Leasure. 
We observed the adoption of an ERM system by our sampled companies from 2002 to 2011, 
getting a strongly balanced panel of 2’000 observations (200 x 10 years). 
The information used in this research was extracted from the annual financial reports 
produced by companies. Specifically, since the reporting of the adoption of ERM is not 
mandatory, we collected by hand all the financial reports and we performed a detailed search 
for ERM evidence (explicit or implicit, like e.g. the hiring of a Chief Risk Officer) in the 
company disclosure. 
From the financial statements, we also collected other accounting and non-accounting data, in 
order to have specific information about each company. Table 1 and 2 describe the main 
characteristics of our dataset. As we can see, 61% of our firms have been starting to adopt and 
ERM system during the time horizon of observation. Moreover, we observe a significant 
increase in the ERM adoption from 2002 to 2011: only 7 (4%) firms in 2002, 78 (39%) firms 
in 2011. 
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Insert Table 1 
 
Insert Table 2 
3.2. Empirical model 
In order to test our hypothesis and detect if the adoption of an ERM approach affects firm 
value across industries, we used the Tobin’s Q as our dependent variable and a set of 
independent variables, composed by our risk management variable plus other control 
variables drawn by the main literature about corporate risk management. 
In particular, the Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio between the sum of the market value of 
equity plus the book value of liabilities over the book value of assets (Smithson, Simkins, 
2005; Cummins, Lewis, Wei, 2006). According to Lang and Stulz (1994), the Tobin’s Q 
dominates other performance measures (like, e.g., the accounting measures or the company 
stock returns) because it doesn’t require any risk adjustment or normalization. Moreover, the 
Tobin’s Q reflects the market expectations and is free from possible managerial manipulation 
of the accounting information. This is important for our analysis as we expect that the ERM 
adoption doesn’t have an immediate effect on the accounting information of the company but 
requires a certain period of time to exhibit its benefits for the company itself (Lindenberg, 
Ross, 1981). 
We perform a fixed effect panel regression analysis to control for the unobservable 
heterogeneity across units (our firms) deriving form variables at company-level not included 
in the model. Formally, the first model (1) we test is: 
 
Qit = α + β1ERM + β2SIZE+ β3LEVERAGE+ β4SALESGROWTH +
β5ROA+ β6DIVIDENDS+ β7BETA+εit   (1) 
 
where i represents the company and t the time (years 2002-2011). 
Focusing on the set of the independent variables, our risk management variable (ERM) is a 
dummy variable, based on the ERM first adoption. We identify the first adoption of an ERM 
system on the company annual financial statements. ERM is set equal to 1 in correspondence 
of the first evidence of ERM adoption and for the years ahead during the period 2002-2011, 
and equal to 0 in correspondence of observations prior to this moment.  
We also consider other control variables that, consistently with the main literature, affect firm 
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value. Specifically, we include the company size, SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of 
the firm total assets. There is evidence that big firms are more likely to implement ERM 
systems (Colquitt, Hoyt, Lee, 1999; Liebenberg, Hoyt, 2003; Beasley, Clune, Hermanson, 
2005). However, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis Weston (2001) find a significantly 
negative relation between size and firm value.  
To control for the relation between firm capital structure and company market value we 
include a financial leverage variable (LEVERAGE) that is equal to the ratio between the book 
value of total liabilities and the book value of equity. The predicted sign of the relation 
between leverage and Tobin’s Q is ambiguous. On the one hand, financial leverage enhances 
firm value to the extent that it reduces free cash flows, which might otherwise be invested by 
self-interested managers in sub-optimal projects (Jensen, 1986); on the other hand, too much 
debt increases the probability of default of the company.  
Then, according to the literature (Allayannis and Weston 2001), as more profitable firms trade 
at premium, we include the company Return on Assets (ROA), measured by the ratio of net 
income on total assets, to control for firm profitability. Our expectation is a positive relation 
between ROA and firm value. In line with Allayannis and Weston (2001), we control for the 
effect of growth opportunities, expecting a positive relation with the company Tobin’s Q. 
Thus, we include in our models the SALESGROWTH variable, measured as the historical 
(one-year) sales growth and used as a proxy for future growth opportunities. 
Finally, we include the control variables DIVIDENDS and BETA. The first one is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the company paid dividends during the corresponding year of 
analysis and value 0 otherwise. The second one is the standard measure of volatility of the 
company stock with respect to the market. The expected sign of the relation between these 
two variables and the Tobin’s Q is as follows: ambiguous in the case of dividends (the 
dividends payment can signal either a lack of new projects with positive NPV or the good 
status of the company, which can distribute the earnings produced); positive in the case of 
beta (more volatility increases the value of any investment project). 
The second purpose of our analysis is to identify the determinants of the adoption of an ERM 
system. For this reason we test a second model (2), formalized as follows: 
 
P(ERM it ) = α + β1SIZE + β 2 LEVERAGE+ β3OPACITY +
β4FINANCIALSLACK + β5∆(EBIT)+ β6VALUECHANGE +εit
 (2) 
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where i represents the company and t the time (years 2002-2011). 
We run a logit panel regression analysis where ERM is our dependent variable. SIZE and 
LEVERAGE are defined as explained above. As for the SIZE variable, recent research shows 
that bigger companies have a greater probability of involving in an ERM adoption because 
they are more complex, face a wider number of risks and have the possibility to sustain the 
administrative cost of an ERM program (Colquitt, Hoyt, Lee, 1999; Hoyt, Merkley, Thiessen, 
2001; Beasley, Clune, Hermanson, 2005; Standard and Poor’s, 2005). As for the LEVERAGE 
variable, Pagach and Warr (2010) show that the relation between ERM and leverage is 
ambiguous. On one side, companies adopting an ERM program have the possibility to reduce 
leverage through a better allocation of the resources within the firm and, consequently, their 
probability of default. However, they can also decide to increase debt in the financial structure 
because the ERM helps the firm in monitoring all risks simultaneously, thus controlling its 
overall risk exposure. Instead, Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) claim that companies with a 
higher leverage are more likely to hire a Chief Risk Officer and move towards and integrated 
risk management. 
Then we control for the company opacity (OPACITY), defined as the annual ratio between the 
intangible assets and the total book value of assets of the company (Pagach, Warr, 2010). 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) argue that firms relatively more opaque should have greater 
benefit from implementing and disclosing ERM programs. Opaque firms are quite difficult to 
be evaluated by outsiders (Pottier, Sommer, 2006), thus a structured ERM program should 
improve the transparency and, as a consequence, have a positive effect on the Tobin’s Q.  
We also consider as control variables the financial slack (FINANCIALSLACK), the annual 
variation of the EBIT (∆EBIT) and the annual change of company value (VALUECHANGE). 
As for the financial slack, defined as the ratio between company liquidity plus short term 
investments over the book value of assets, the evidence is not unanimous (Pagach and Warr 
2010): some firms involved in an ERM protocol have a higher level of financial slack in order 
to reduce their probability of default; others, instead, have a lower financial slack thanks to 
the enhanced management of risks. 
Also the relation between the ERM implementation and the annual variations of the EBIT is 
ambiguous: in theory, we would expect that a better risk management reduce the earnings 
volatility but this is not true for all companies (Pagach, Warr, 2010, 2011; Liebenberg, Hoyt, 
2003). Finally, we expect that firms adopting an ERM program reduce their market value 
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changes, as it is a good signal for the stockholders (Pagach, Warr, 2011).   
      
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
This section reports summary statistics on the main variables of the models we tested. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Companies of our dataset are characterized by a mean size of 10.23. The profitability of them 
is set around 5.8% in terms of ROA. With respect to the financial leverage, the average value 
is equal to 4.93. 
The company mean value (in terms of Q) is 1.67 with standard deviation of 1.13.  
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix of Q variable with the other selected variables. All the 
correlations among the independent variables are not significantly high, with the exception of 
SALEGROWTH1 and DIVIDENDS with ERM variable. For this reason some of the reported 
results (see Table 3, column 1) could suffer from this multicollinearity issue. However, when 
we control for this, the results do not change (see Table 4, column 2). 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
In order to test our hypothesis we run a fixed effect panel regression on different versions of 
model (1) and (2). The main results are reported in Table 4 and 5. 
In Table 4, columns 1 and 2 show that the ERM adoption has a strong significant positive 
impact on company value. Among the control variables, leverage (LEVERAGE), size (SIZE), 
ROA and the company beta (BETA) have a significant impact on the company value. In 
particular, both the variables ROA and BETA have a positive effect, meaning that the most 
profitable and volatile companies have the highest value. Whereas, LEVERAGE and SIZE 
have a negative impact on firm value. The other control variables, such as SALEGROWTH 
and DIVINDENDS do not affect TOBIN’s Q. Column 3 reports the selected model, including 
only significant variables.  
 
Insert Table 4 
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Overall, these results show that ERM increases the firm value, regardless the specific industry 
user. This result means that the market perceives the involvement of the company in an ERM 
system as a good signal. 
Table 5 shows the main results of model (2), which focuses on the determinants of the 
probability of a company to adopt an ERM system. We performed a fixed effects logistic 
regression, using as independent variables the most cited in the main literature about ERM. 
 
Insert Table 5 
Column 2 evidences that the ERM adoption depends on the company opacity (OPACITY), on 
the company size (SIZE) and on the financial slack (FINANCIALSLACK). Therefore, the 
presence of intangible assets, the company dimension, and the presence of free liquidity, push 
firms to better manage risks within the organization.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The increasingly turbulent and complex economic scenario brought research about risk 
management again to the forefront. Historically, companies have managed risks in silos, 
following a Traditional Risk Management (TRM) approach, and using hedging derivatives 
and corporate insurance as the mail tools for this activity. In recent years, some firms have 
started to adopt an integrated approach, called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) in order 
to deal with the market complexity. The empirical research regarding the ERM adoption is 
trying to investigate the relation between this choice and firm value. The majority of the 
studies are concentrated on financial companies, specifically on insurance companies. 
Nevertheless, results are still ambiguous. A possible reason consists of the lack of an effective 
proxy for the degree of ERM capability and implementation. In 2006 S&P produced an ERM 
rating, but only for insurance companies, thus making the study of ERM adoption easier for 
companies belonging to this industry. In our study we treat ERM as a dummy variable, setting 
a value equal to one to companies that explicitly declare in their financial reports the adoption 
of an integrated approach to risks and also to those that have hired a CRO. The main 
contribution of our research lies in the attempt to investigate the effect of ERM adoption also 
on the firm value of non-financial firms. Moreover, we try to discover the determinants of an 
ERM adoption. Our results show that: overall, ERM increases firm value, regardless the 
specific industry user. Among the control variables we used in our model, we find that 
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financial leverage, profitability, size and beta seem to affect the firm value, whereas the 
dividend policy and sales growth of the firm are weakly significant.  
In terms of economic implications, our results seem to show that the market perceives the 
ERM adoption as a value driver, and not as a cost for the company. This pushes the research 
about this new paradigm in risk management to go ahead and better understand the 
organizational implication, the necessary steps, the difficulties and the real benefits of this 
holistic approach.  
The results presented in this paper are still preliminary and not conclusive. The research needs 
further empirical analysis. Specifically, to check for the robustness of our results, we will 
collect and introduce new control variables in the models. Secondly, in order to control for 
market inefficiencies that could affect the Tobin’s Q, we will use other proxies for the 
dependent variable, such as, for instance, company performance measurements. Finally, to 
generalize the results, we will enlarge our dataset to other companies; in particular we will 
extend our data both at industry and country level. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. The ERM disclosure 
PANEL A 
  ERM adoption during 2002-2011 % 
ERM = 1 122 61% 
ERM = 0 78 39% 
 
PANEL B 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 TOT. % 
ERM = 1 78 71 63 52 43 33 26 17 9 7 399 19.95% 
ERM = 0 122 129 137 148 157 167 174 183 191 193 1601 80.05% 
TOT. 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 2000 100% 
 
 
 
Table 2. The model variables 
 
PANEL A 
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PANEL B 
 
 
Notes: this tables summarize the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in model (1) and (2). Panel A reports stats for the general dataset, Panel B divides stats by 
ERM value (0 versus 1). The variables are defined in the following way: Q is is the ratio between the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
over the book value of assets, ERM is set equal to 1 in correspondence to the first evidence of ERM usage and for the subsequent years ahead during the period 2002-2011, 
and equal to 0 in correspondence to observations prior to the first observed ERM usage. SIZE is the natural log of the firm total assets, LEVERAGE is is equal to the ratio 
of the book value of total liabilities to the book value of equity, ROA is measured as the ratio of net income on total assets, SALESGROWTH  is measured as the historical 
(one-year) sales growth and used as a proxy for future growth opportunities, DIVIDENDS is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company paid dividends during the 
corresponding year of analysis and value 0 otherwise, BETA is the standard measure of volatility of the company stock with respect to the market, OPACITY is defined as 
the annual ratio between the intangible assets and the total book value of assets of the company, FINANCIALSLACK is the ratio between company liquidity plus short term 
investments over the book value of assets, ∆EBIT is the annual variation of the EBIT and VALUECHANGE is the annual change of company value. 
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Tabel 3. The Pearson’s correlations among model variables 
 
  
 
Notes: This table reports the correlations among variables. The variables are defined as follow: 
Q is is the ratio between the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities over the book value of assets, ERM is set equal to 1 in correspondence to 
the first evidence of ERM usage and for the subsequent years ahead during the period 2002-2011, and equal to 0 in correspondence to observations prior to the first 
observed ERM usage. SIZE is the natural log of the firm total assets, LEVERAGE is is equal to the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book value of equity, 
ROA is measured as the ratio of net income on total assets, SALESGROWTH is measured as the historical (one-year) sales growth and used as a proxy for future growth 
opportunities, DIVIDENDS is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company paid dividends during the corresponding year of analysis and value 0 otherwise, BETA is 
the standard measure of volatility of the company stock with respect to the market, OPACITY is defined as the annual ratio between the intangible assets and the total book 
value of assets of the company, FINANCIALSLACK is the ratio between company liquidity plus short term investments over the book value of assets, ∆EBIT is the annual 
variation of the EBIT and VALUECHANGE is the annual change of company value. 
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Table 4. The ERM adoption effect on firm value 
 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: this table shows the results for model (1). The variables are defined in the following way: Q is is the ratio between the sum of the market value of equity plus the 
book value of liabilities over the book value of assets, ERM is set equal to 1 in correspondence to the first evidence of ERM usage and for the subsequent years ahead 
during the period 2002-2011, and equal to 0 in correspondence to observations prior to the first observed ERM usage. SIZE is the natural log of the firm total assets, 
LEVERAGE is is equal to the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book value of equity, ROA is measured as the ratio of net income on total assets, 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Q Q Q 
    
ERM 0.122* 0.106** 0.106** 
 (0.0630) (0.0335) (0.0331) 
SIZE -0.417*** -0.358*** -0.359*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
LEVERAGE -0.0143* -5.43e-05  
 (0.0556) (0.974)  
SALESGROWTH
1 
0.728   
 (0.126)   
ROA 2.757*** 2.541*** 2.542*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
DIVIDENDS 0.0503   
 (0.587)   
BETA 0.518*** 0.327*** 0.326*** 
 (5.92e-09) (9.41e-07) (8.31e-07) 
Constant 5.129*** 4.862*** 4.864*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
Observations 1,047 1,905 1,905 
R-squared 0.167 0.122 0.122 
Number of ID 119 204 204 
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SALESGROWTH is measured as the historical (one-year) sales growth and used as a proxy for future growth opportunities, DIVIDENDS is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the company paid dividends during the corresponding year of analysis and value 0 otherwise, BETA is the standard measure of volatility of the company stock 
with respect to the market, OPACITY is defined as the annual ratio between the intangible assets and the total book value of assets of the company, FINANCIALSLACK is 
the ratio between company liquidity plus short term investments over the book value of assets, ∆EBIT is the annual variation of the EBIT and VALUECHANGE is the 
annual change of company value.  
 
Table 5. The determinants of the ERM adoption  
 
 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: this table shows the results for model (2). The variables are defined in the following way: Q is is the ratio between the sum of the market value of equity plus the 
book value of liabilities over the book value of assets, ERM is set equal to 1 in correspondence to the first evidence of ERM usage and for the subsequent years ahead 
during the period 2003-2010, and equal to 0 in correspondence to observations prior to the first observed ERM usage. SIZE is the natural log of the firm total assets, 
LEVERAGE is is equal to the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book value of equity, ROA is measured as the ratio of net income on total assets, 
  (1) (2) 
EQUATION VARIABLES ERM ERM 
    
ERM SIZE 7.299*** 7.108*** 
  (0) (0) 
 LEVERAGE 0.00713  
  (0.689)  
 OPACITY 11.28*** 15.09*** 
  (2.15e-05) (0) 
 FINANCIALSLAC
K 
5.191 5.029** 
  (0.101) (0.0465) 
 DELTAEBIT -0.0197  
  (0.369)  
 VALUECHANGE -0.434  
  (0.161)  
    
 Observations 606 706 
 Number of ID 68 71 
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SALESGROWTH is measured as the historical (one-year) sales growth and used as a proxy for future growth opportunities, DIVIDENDS is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the company paid dividends during the corresponding year of analysis and value 0 otherwise, BETA is the standard measure of volatility of the company stock 
with respect to the market, OPACITY is defined as the annual ratio between the intangible assets and the total book value of assets of the company, FINANCIALSLACK is 
the ratio between company liquidity plus short term investments over the book value of assets, ∆EBIT is the annual variation of the EBIT and VALUECHANGE is the 
annual change of company value. 
 
